Depth report

　　

On January 18, China and Singapore reached an agreement to hold the Joint Committee on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) meeting in February. This highest-level annual bilateral meeting, which began in 2004, was not held in 2016 as an exception. The resumption of the conference and its early implementation in February has a constructive effect on bilateral relations. However, the future of China-New Zealand relations cannot be resolved by the Joint Committee. Both parties need to reflect, and then determine a new guiding ideology for dealing with the relationship with the other party.

    From the special meeting of China-ASEAN foreign ministers in Yuxi in June, to the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Margarita Island, Venezuela in September, to the Hong Kong armored vehicle incident in November, Sino-Singaporean relations have been turbulent from time to time. So far, the level of officials in both countries has been limited (the Singaporean defense minister has recently spoken for the first time, and the Chinese side is limited to the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), but these events have a much greater impact on the relationship between the two countries. Neither China nor Singapore meant to show weakness. The ancients said that wisdom is used for small things, and benevolence is used for small things. According to this statement, it seems that Singapore’s response is not “wise” enough, and China’s approach has room for improvement in terms of “benevolence”.

    For Singapore, one of the “not smart enough”: as a non-sclaimer of the South China Sea dispute, and a coordinator of China-ASEAN relations, however, when China hopes that the South China Sea issue will cool down and turn the pages as soon as possible, it will push ASEAN in the South China Sea from time to time. The confrontation with China on the issue actually assumed the role of the Philippines in the South China Sea issue during the Aquino period. Small countries take the lead against big countries. This is a rare phenomenon in international politics, but it happened in Singapore, and it was aimed at its own "cultural mother country." After the "South China Sea Arbitration" was decided, Lee Hsien Loong visited the United States and Japan in August and September respectively, but did not visit China, and made comments in the United States that China considers to be pressure. Obviously, this is not a mature big-power balance diplomacy, and it also offsets the bonus points given to him by the "Xi Ma Club" in Sino-Singapore relations.

    The second "not smart enough": not paying attention to the role of cultural characteristics in diplomacy, discarding the essence of "comfort", the ASEAN Way (ASEAN Way), and the role of face culture in China's diplomacy, tending to use Western thinking and Ways to deal with China, such as preference for open response, underestimation of private communication, highlighting rationality and law, ignoring emotion and politics, and improper grasp of "public expression issues" and "private communication issues". In the eyes of the Chinese, this is a bit of a "non-my race" flavor. This may be the underlying reason why China's "left, right, and Chinese" have expressed disgust with Singapore this time.

    "Not wise enough" third: Not paying attention to cultivating friendship with Chinese leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but trying to play the role of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew can play the role of a cross-strait friend and even a "mentor" because he has gained the respect and a certain trust of these leaders. Under this premise, the suggestions and criticisms he expresses in a soft manner and straightforwardly are cross-strait Acceptable to leaders. Criticism is expressed publicly, or it is some minor issues or some abstract issues. He will never let Chinese leaders think that he is an outsider and try to take the lead against China, even though he was evaluated by former British Foreign Secretary George Brown as "the best bloody Englishman east of Suez" (the best bloody Englishman east of Suez).

    The fourth "not wise enough": The words and deeds of the diplomats have not been considered. Looking at the past few years, Lee Hsien Loong's last visit to China was in 2013, and his public speeches over the past few years have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction and criticism of China. Under his "set tone", Singaporean diplomats followed suit. As far as 2016 is concerned, at least there have been incidents such as the foreign minister's refusal to attend the joint press conference and two senior diplomats accusing China of dividing ASEAN. Co-hosting the press conference after the talks in accordance with the agreement is a basic norm of diplomatic conduct. The message conveyed by refusing to perform this duty is very negative and not at all what the coordinating country should do. The accusation that China divides ASEAN is a typical small country-centrism. He regards the "ASEAN unified position" he strongly advocates as higher than the national interests of the member states and ignores China's important national interests. For the unfriendly actions taken jointly by small countries, can't the big countries take countermeasures? Should ASEAN member states put the "ASEAN unified position" above their own major interests? There is a lot of evidence that even Singapore cannot do this.

    The list of "not smart enough" can still be listed, but it seems unnecessary. Regardless of whether Mr. Lee Hsien Loong wants to become "the most American person west of Hawaii", what we see is that Singapore has always been one of the ASEAN countries with the closest relationship with the United States in terms of security issues. This situation is likely to continue. This is Singapore's right. However, it is a bit too much to take the lead in confronting China on the South China Sea issue, and to act with the attitude of truth everywhere, and even to accuse China of splitting ASEAN and refusing to attend the press conference regardless of etiquette.

    Judging from the armored personnel carrier incident, Singapore still has not shown any intention to reflect and adjust, and the meaning of dissatisfaction and blaming China is still obvious. The latest development is that Defense Minister Huang Yonghong believes that the nine armored personnel carriers are Singapore’s national property and enjoy sovereign immunity. There are several problems here: First, sovereign acts can be exempted, but commercial contracts cannot be exempted. This transportation is a commercial act. Second, sovereign immunity is not unconditional. If a transshipment license (license) is applied for, the country that owns the port must implement sovereign immunity even if the goods have already landed. If there is no application, it depends on the laws of the country where the port belongs. If there are no legal restrictions, it may lead to a situation: any country can use the ports of other countries to transfer weapons on a large scale based on "sovereign immunity." Third, Hong Kong has strict legal regulations on strategic substances, and it is normal law enforcement to seize armored vehicles that have landed ashore. Fourth, mainland China has always opposed the military and security cooperation between Singapore and Taiwan, and Singapore has long known it for a long time.

    Frankly speaking, international law is only one of the means to adjust the interests of nations, and it is not rigorous in itself. Therefore, political relations and political will between nations often become a necessary prerequisite for the operationalization of immunity. Under the current circumstances, Singapore’s act of playing the legal card is understandable, but it does not help solve the problem.

    If Singapore continues its current thinking on China’s policy, it is likely to lead to a result: China tries to eliminate emotional and cultural factors as much as possible when handling relations with New Zealand, and act in accordance with rationality and interests as much as possible. Now China can influence Singapore in many ways. According to the author's observation, it hasn't been used much yet.

    On the whole, Singapore's China policy is still stuck in the era of Lee Kuan Yew. However, the time and space conditions are very different. Moreover, the current Singapore leadership is well versed in European and American culture, but the understanding and importance of Chinese culture, the skills in handling relations with China, and the friendship with the Chinese leadership cannot be compared with Lee Kuan Yew’s generation. Compared to people. This requires Singapore's reflection, instead of saying that "China is angry at every turn." Perhaps the time has come to formulate a "post-Lee Kuan Yew era" policy toward China, including the psychology, behavior, and adjustment approaches to China, in order to handle relations with major powers such as the United States and China in a more balanced manner. It may be necessary to pay attention to the research and application of Chinese culture, strengthen private relations with Chinese leaders, and distinguish between public statements and privately proposed issues. Duterte’s approach may be of reference significance: while appropriately opening up relations with the United States and strengthening relations with Japan, he quickly normalized China-Philippines relations by setting aside the results of the arbitration, showing weakness, approaching the relationship, and taking the line of family affection. Duterte’s great power diplomacy is relatively balanced, and his understanding and application of Chinese culture are quite adequate. He knows that face culture and pragmatism are the two major characteristics of Chinese diplomacy.

    No matter what Singapore's final choice is, it is necessary to pay attention to one point: Lee Kuan Yew around 1965 could vigorously oppose the Communist Party, and Lee Hsien Loong around 2017 should not vigorously resist China.

    For China, its national strength is increasing, its global influence is expanding, and the Chinese government is also very aware of the importance of people-to-people bonds. However, the overall attractiveness to neighboring countries has not increased significantly in the past few years. Suspicions, worries, and fears are growing, and the people's minds in some countries are becoming alienated. This has even appeared in countries and regions that have been deeply influenced by Chinese culture: South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and Hong Kong. This is also worthy of reflection. It is a common phenomenon that surrounding countries feel discomfort and even fear during the rise of the country. But have some policy actions in China exacerbated this tendency? Why is China's restraint in dealing with the South China Sea issue rarely noticed and acknowledged? How to increase its attractiveness to neighboring countries?

    In terms of being a traditional power, China has 2000 years of historical experience, but in terms of being a modern power, China is still in the learning stage. If China has some experience in handling bilateral relations with major countries, it still needs a lot of supplementary lessons on how to handle relations with neighboring small and medium-sized countries, especially in the context of the “Belt and Road” initiative.

    In order to better promote the construction of the “Belt and Road”, it may be necessary to designate 2017 as the “Year of Reflection”. The author’s research experience is: Peripheral diplomacy has become the top priority of China’s diplomacy in 2016. Many existing diplomatic measures are effective. They are manifested in frequent political exchanges, a large number of economic cooperation achievements, and a substantial increase in personnel exchanges. Security cooperation is also advancing. However, there seems to be room for further improvement in the following points: more use of multilateral frameworks that are binding on oneself, strengthening of the awareness of "empathy" in the process of formulating foreign policies in neighboring countries, and the simultaneous implementation of officials and people that make ordinary people in neighboring countries feel. People's Heart Project". This hope can also be read in the relevant public remarks of Singaporean officials such as Lee Hsien Loong. "Listening to the opinions of the world, and moderating the hopes of all directions" is one of the "keys" of the Ming princes in governing state affairs in the past dynasties of China. Carrying forward it will greatly help China's rise.

    China-New Zealand relations are close and rich in layers. In the past few years, bilateral economic cooperation and personnel exchanges have remained frequent. Some twists and turns in political relations are also normal. If both parties handle it well, turning "danger" into "opportunity" is a high probability event. I wish the political relations between China and New Zealand go through the trough and will make a bright future soon.